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HAS Abercrombie BECOME UNFASIONABLE?
A REVIEW OF TRENDS IN PRODUCT CONFIGURATION
TRADE DRESS CASES AND A PROPOSED TEST FOR UNIFORMITY
Lucy C. Ridgway*
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme Court reconciled the split
in authority among the federal courts of appeals regarding whether proof of sec-
ondary meaning was required to prevail on a trade dress infringement claim.1
Since Two Pesos, plaintiffs no longer must prove that their product's trade dress
or configuration has obtained secondary meaning; rather, the Court held that
trade dress was capable of being "inherently distinctive."2 However, the Court
offered no guidance as to what makes trade dress "inherently distinctive" as
opposed to "merely descriptive" or "generic. '
Consequently, another circuit court split has developed in which several cir-
cuits have held that the traditional trademark taxonomy, the Abercrombie test,
should also be applied in trade dress cases.' Other circuits have rejected the
Abercrombie analysis, particularly with regard to product configuration trade
dress, and have instead fashioned their own tests to determine whether a product
configuration is inherently distinctive.' The result is a variety of disparate tests
that can yield inconsistent results depending on the jurisdiction of the trademark
suit." Thus, the Supreme Court's attempt to unify trademark and trade dress law
has led to even more inconsistency, especially in the realm of product configura-
tion trade dress.
The purpose of this Comment is to review the lower courts' interpretation of
Two Pesos with respect to product configurations, a subset of trade dress, and to
offer a test that would better serve to identify inherently distinctive product con-
figurations. Part I provides a brief overview of the development of the trade
dress doctrine and the expansion of this doctrine to include product configura-
tions. Part II presents the various tests fashioned by the lower courts to deter-
mine whether a product configuration is inherently distinctive. Further, this sec-
tion attempts to prove that the various tests courts employ yield inconsistent
results and may improperly extend trademark protection to useful product fea-
tures. Finally, Part III suggests a test for determining inherent distinctiveness in
product configuration trade dress cases that is uniform and promotes competition
by strictly applying the functionality doctrine.
* The Author would like to thank Professor H. Lee Hetherington for his encouragement and scholarly advice
throughout the development of this Comment.
I. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
2. Id. at 770.
3. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
4. See Ashley Furniture Indus. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999): Pebble Beach Co. v.
Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F3d 526, 540 (5th Cir. 1998); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F3d 780, 788 (8th Cir.
1995).
5. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 E3d 27, 41 (1st Cir. 1998); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs
Ltd., 71 F3d 996, 1006-09 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco, 40 F3d at 1432.
6. See. Ashley, 187 F3d at 363; Lund, 163 F.3d at 27; Pebble Beach, 155 F3d at 526; Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at
996; Stuart Hall, 51 F3d at 780; Duraco, 40 E3d at 1431.
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1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADE DRESS DOCTRINE
In 1946, trademark law was codified with the adoption of the Lanham Act.'
According to this Act, a trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."8
Famous trademarks include the word "Coke," the slogan "Did somebody say
McDonald's?," and the Nike "swoosh."
In addition to words, slogans, and symbols, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
may also protect a product's packaging and the product itself.' This is known as
trade dress protection."0 Specifically, the term "trade dress" refers to the packag-
ing and product design that make up the overall look of a product." In order to
receive protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's trade dress
must distinguish the product from those manufactured by others as well as serve
as an indicator of the source of the product. 2 In other words, trade dress must be
inherently distinctive or capable of becoming distinctive through secondary
meaning. 13
Trade dress was initially limited to include only a product's packaging or wrap-
ping-for example, the appearance of the container in which a pen is sold. This
definition, however, has been judicially expanded to include features of the prod-
uct itself-for example, the appearance of the pen.' The inclusion of product
configurations in the trade dress analysis is, in some respects, mere judicial
acknowledgement of the equal capacity of a product configuration to serve as a
source identifier in the minds of consumers.' To establish infringement of a
product configuration trademark under the Lanham Act, just as in other trade
dress actions, a product configuration must be distinctive and nonfunctional.'"
A. Distinctiveness
The traditional approach in evaluating the inherent distinctiveness of trade-
marks was articulated by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127(1994).
8. Id. § 1127.
9. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992).
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 764.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
(I) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods,
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
13. Id.
14. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11 th Cir. 1983).
15. See id. In fact, this expanded view of trade dress was adopted statutorily in 1980 when Congress
amended the Lanham Act.
16. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1993)).
[VOL. 20:179
19991 CHANGING TRENDS IN TRADE DRESS CASES
World, Inc." According to the Abercrombie test, trademarks are classified as (1)
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful. 8 These cat-
egories essentially reflect the relationship of the mark to the product or service it
is meant to identify.19 Generic words and symbols-such as the word "car" for
automobile-constitute the common name of the product or service.2" Such
marks are incapable of differentiating one producer of a product or service from
another; thus, words and symbols in the generic category can never be protected
as trademarks. 2 ' Like generic marks, words and symbols in the second catego-
ry--descriptive marks such as the term "crunchy" for cookies-are not viewed
as inherently distinctive.2 2 However, descriptive marks can become distinctive if
they are used sufficiently to acquire secondary meaning.23 Secondary meaning
exists when a significant number of prospective purchasers associate the mark,
when used in connection with a particular type of good, service or business, with
a particular source. 2' A mark that has acquired secondary meaning is capable of
distinguishing the goods, services, or business of one person from those of oth-
ers.
2 5
Suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks are considered inherently distinctive
and may receive Lanham Act protection without a showing of secondary mean-
ing.28 A mark is suggestive if it "requires imagination, thought and perception to
reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods. '27 For example, the trademark
"Coppertone" is suggestive of suntan lotion. Both arbitrary and fanciful marks
have no relation to the product or service they are meant to identify.2 Arbitrary
marks-such as the word "Apple" for computers-consist of marks that use
common words in an unfamiliar way." Fanciful marks comprise words and sym-
bols invented solely for their use as trademarks. 30 Examples of fanciful marks
include the coined words "Exxon" and "Xerox."'"
The confusion with classifying distinctiveness in product configuration cases
resulted from courts applying tests originally developed in the context of word
marks to product configuration trade dress.32 While the Abercrombie spectrum
works well in relation to word marks, courts have had difficulty applying these
classifications to trade dress generally, and product configurations specifically.'
Although the most recent Supreme Court case in this area resolved a major con-





22. Id. at 10.
23. Id.
24. RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(b) (1993).
25. Id.
26. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11.
27. Id. (citing Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs. Inc., 295 F Supp 479,488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
28. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd,, 155 F3d 526, 540 (5th Cir. 1998).
29. Abercrombie, 537 F2d at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Chad M. Smith, Undressing Abercrombie: Defining When Trade Dress is Inherently Distinctive, 80
J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 401,429 (1998).
33. See Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1440-41 (3d Cir. 1994).
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flict in trade dress jurisprudence-whether trade dress could be inherently dis-
tinctive-the appropriateness of applying the traditional trademark taxonomy to
trade dress and product configurations was not decided.34
B. Functionality
In addition to being distinctive, a product's trade dress must be nonfunctional
to receive protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act .3 The functionality
doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protect-
ing a trademark owner's goodwill, from inhibiting legitimate competition by
allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.36 The "right to copy"
allows producers to copy the functional features of competing products to foster
legitimate competition in the marketplace.37 It is the province of patent law, not
trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over
product designs for a limited time, after which competitors are free to use the
innovation.' If a product's functional features could be used as trademarks, a
monopoly over such features could be obtained while avoiding the stringent
requirements of patent law.39 Further, the monopoly could be extended forever as
trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity.' Therefore, in determining whether a
product feature is functional, courts must strike a balance between the "right to
copy" and the right of businesses to protect their method of trade identification. 1
II. Two Pesos: A UNIFIED APPROACH TO THE INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS
STANDARD IN TRADEMARK AND TRADE DRESS
In 1987, Taco Cabana, a Mexican restaurant chain, sued Two Pesos, a rival
chain, claiming that Two Pesos deliberately copied Taco Cabana's dfcor.'2 Taco
Cabana argued that the restaurant's trade dress-a combination of nonfunctional
features such as bright festive colors and distinctive roof design-created a dis-
tinctive total image for its restaurant chain that was entitled to Lanham Act pro-
tection." The trial court agreed and held that "trade dress may include the shape
and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying sign, the
interior kitchen floor plan, the dfcor, the menu, the equipment used to serve
food, the servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on the total image of the
restaurant."" The jury found that Two Pesos intentionally and deliberately
infringed Taco Cabana's trade dress and awarded Taco Cabana millions of dollars
in damages.'
5
34. See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
35. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
36. Id. at 164.




41. Id. at 1339.
42. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 765 n.I.
45. Id. at 764.
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On appeal, Two Pesos argued that trade dress was not capable of being inher-
ently distinctive; therefore, Taco Cabana should have been required to prove that
the restaurant's d6cor had acquired secondary meaning."" Before the Supreme
Court's decision in 1992, some courts of appeal held that trade dress was not
capable of being inherently distinctive, and secondary meaning needed to be
proved in order to afford protection.' The Court, in a unanimous decision, held
that "trade dress that is inherently distinctive is protectable under [section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act] without a showing that it ha[d] acquired secondary mean-
ing."' 8 Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the majority rule followed by the
Fifth,'9 Seventh' and Eleventh Circuits 5-that trade dress was capable of being
inherently distinctive.
By overruling the Second and Third Circuits, which had required a showing of
secondary meaning for protection of trade dress, the Two Pesos Court unified the
standard for trademark and trade dress law. 2 As in traditional trademark cases, a
trade dress plaintiff whose product is inherently distinctive can receive automatic
protection without a showing of secondary meaning. Two Pesos, however, did
not set out a clear test as to what constitutes inherently distinctive trade dress.
Lower courts have thus been left to grapple with the inescapable question: How
should inherent distinctiveness in trade dress be determined?
III. THE AFTERMATH OF Two Pesos: A CIRCUIT-BY-CIRCUIT REVIEW OF TESTS FOR
INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS IN PRODUCT CONFIGURATION CASES
This section reviews the various tests currently used to determine whether a
product configuration is inherently distinctive. The cases discussed illustrate the
present dispute regarding whether the traditional trademark taxonomy-the
Abercrombie spectrum-applies to product configuration cases. For example,
the First, Second and Third Circuits have rejected the Abercrombie test and have
fashioned their own tests to determine whether product configuration trade dress
is inherently distinctive." The Fourth and Eighth Circuits continue to use the
five gradations of inherent distinctiveness set forth in Abercrombie for both lin-
gual marks and product configuration trade dress."
46. Id. at 766.
47. See, e.g., Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981).
48. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767.
49. SeeTaco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc. 932 F2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991).
50. See Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters. Inc., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992).
51. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F2d 854 (1 th Cir. 1983).
52. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770.
53. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.,
71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
54. See, Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999); Stuart Hall
Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 E3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit continues to use the Abercrombie analysis
in trade dress cases; however, the court has not explicitly adopted this test in a product configuration trade dress
case. Although the Fifth Circuit has not rejected the Abercrombie test in product configuration cases, it has
cited Duraco favorably, stating "the gravamen of trademark law is source identification." See Sunbeam Prods.,
Inc. v. West Bend Co.,123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding the plaintiff's product configuration had acquired
distinctiveness through secondary meaning, thus failing to reach the issue of what constitutes inherently distinc-
tive product configurations).
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A. First Circuit-I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.
In 1998, the First Circuit tackled the issue of what constitutes an inherently
distinctive product configuration.5" The case involved allegations that the defen-
dant's faucet impermissibly copied the plaintiff's "falling water" faucet design."
Lund's faucet was designed by noted architect Arne Jacobsen and received
numerous design awards.5 8 Kohler admittedly copied the design and offered the
faucet for sale at a lower price.59
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the
Abercrombie factors did not apply and that Lund's faucet was not inherently dis-
tinctive." Discussing the relevance of Two Pesos in determining a test for inher-
ent distinctiveness, the court stated:
[W]e do not believe that the Supreme Court's endorsement of the Abercrombie
test in Two Pesos requires a strict application of the Abercrombie test in all con-
texts, particularly where product design is involved. The Supreme Court stated
only that '[m]arks are often classified in' the five Abercrombie categories. The
Court did not mandate the application of the Abercrombie test; rather, it
affirmed the use of the Abercrombie factors in the case before it. The holding of
Tvo Pesos was that plaintiffs seeking protection for inherently distinctive trade
dress are not required to demonstrate secondary meaning. Unless the Court
decides to carve out an exception to this rule for claims about product design,
which we deem unlikely, then the holding must be honored. And so we agree
with the Eighth Circuit that the test for inherent distinctiveness should not be
altered to the degree that it eviscerates the distinction between inherently dis-
tinctive trade dress and trade dress that has acquired secondary meaning. We do
not believe, however, that analysis of the problem using different factors than
the Abercrombie factors results in such an outcome."'
The court concluded by rejecting the Abercrombie test as a means of determin-
ing inherent distinctiveness in product configurations and held that the proper
inquiry was an adaptation of the Seabrook Foods test enunciated by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar- Well Foods, Ltd. 2
The threshold question in the Seabrook Foods test, according to the First Circuit,
was "whether the design, shape, or combination of elements is so unique, unusu-
55. Lund, 163 E3d 27 (1998).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 32.
58. Id. at 34.
59. Id.
60. Id. at41.
61. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
62. 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1997). The Seabrook court set out a three-prong test that the First Circuit modi-
fied into a single inquiry. The original test stated:
In determining whether a design is arbitrary or distinctive this court has looked to whether it was a
'common' basic shape or design, whether it was unique or unusual in a particular field, [or] whether
it was a mere refinement of a commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a par-
ticular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods ....
Id. at 1344.
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al or unexpected... that one can assume without proof that it will automatically
be perceived by customers as an indicator of origin-a trademark.""
Unlike the other tests formulated in opposition to the Abercrombie test, this
test does not foreclose the possibility of proving secondary meaning where the
configuration is not inherently distinctive." If a product design is not so unique,
unusual or unexpected that it would qualify as inherently distinctive, a producer
could still show that customers have come to associate the design with the pro-
ducer. Thus, the line between inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning is
not blurred by this test.
Although the district court applied a different test in determining that the Lund
faucet was not inherently distinctive, the First Circuit held that the finding could
not be termed clearly erroneous and therefore affirmed."' The court held that the
test used by the district court-the Knitwaves test"-was consistent with the test
set out by the court of appeals; however, the First Circuit criticized the Knitwaves
test as relying, problematically, on the producer's intent in creating a product that
was indicative of its source.67
B. Second Circuit-Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.6
Knitwaves involved the copying of plaintiff's "squirrel" and "leaf" design
appliques on children's sweaters. The district court found that the sweater
design was inherently distinctive, and that the defendant's copies created a likeli-
hood of confusion." Rejecting the Abercrombie test as inappropriate for product
configuration, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's finding of distinc-
tiveness, holding that product features must be "likely to serve primarily as a
designator of origin of the product" to be inherently distinctive.' Applying this
test, the court found that the plaintiff's sweater designs were not inherently dis-
tinctive because the designs were merely aesthetic and not intended to serve pri-
marily as source identification. 2 Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, "a
plaintiff must do more than demonstrate that the appearance of its product serves
some source identifying function. It must demonstrate that the primary purpose
behind the design was to identify its product's source."73
Courts and commentators have criticized the Knitwaves test as relying inappro-
priately on the producer's intent.'4 Distinctiveness is a measure of the product
63. Lund, 163 F.3d at 40 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPE'nnoN § 8:13 (4th ed. 1996).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 32.
66. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
67. Lund, 163 F3d at 41.
68. 71 F3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 997.
71. Id. at 1008 (citing Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 E3d 1431, 1449 (1994)).
72. Id. at 1009.
73. Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 E Supp. 1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (applying Knitwaves).
74. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 E3d 27 (1998); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915
E Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), overruled by Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F3d 373 (2d
Cir. 1997); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade
Dress, 75 N.C. L. REv. 471 (1997).
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feature's effect on consumers and has nothing to do with the intent of the produc-
er."5 If inherent distinctiveness were to hinge on how a manufacturer intended to
promote her design, the evidentiary requirements for inherent distinctiveness and
secondary meaning would be virtually identical.7" This is the very criticism the
First Circuit sought to avoid by basing its test solely on the predictive inquiry of
whether the product feature will be perceived by customers as an indicator of ori-
gin.7
C. Third Circuit-Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises.78
The Third Circuit was the first circuit to confront the issue of what constitutes
inherently distinctive trade dress after the Supreme Court's decision in Two
Pesos.79 In Duraco, the manufacturer of Grecian urn-style plastic planters sought
a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant from manufacturing a similar
product.' The Third Circuit held that the urns were not inherently distinctive
because there was no evidence that consumers associated the planters with the
Duraco source name.8' Although the Duraco court held that the urns were not
distinctive, the court found that product configurations could be inherently dis-
tinctive; however, the existing tests for inherent distinctiveness-the
Abercrombie spectrum-should only apply to word marks and product packaging
trade dress.82
In declining to adopt the Abercrombie test, the court gave two reasons the clas-
sic trademark taxonomy should not be applied to product configuration trade
dress: (1) product configurations bear a different relationship to the product than
do trademarks (i.e., a product's configuration cannot be said to be "arbitrary,"
"suggestive" or "descriptive" in relation to itself); and (2) unlike traditional
trademarks, one cannot automatically assume that product configurations will
serve a source-identifying function.83 In place of the Abercrombie test, the court
introduced a stricter test for inherent distinctiveness. In the Third Circuit, to be
inherently distinctive, product configurations must be: "(i) unusual and memo-
rable; (ii) conceptually separable from the product; and (iii) likely to serve pri-
marily as a designator of origin of the product."8 '
While several circuits have derived their tests for inherent distinctiveness from
this expression by the Third Circuit, 8 no court has expressly adopted the test, and
two courts have expressly rejected it.8 The Eighth Circuit criticized the Duraco
75. Lund, 163 F.3d at 40-41.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 49.
78. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastics Enters., 40 F3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
79. Id.
80. id. at 1433.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1440.
83. Id. at 1440-41.
84. Id. at 1434.
85. See, I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd.,
71 F3d 996, 1008 (2d Cir. 1995).
86. See Ashley Furniture Indus. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999); Stuart Hall Co. v.
Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995).
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test as contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Two Pesos.87 The Eighth Circuit
read Two Pesos as relying "on a presumption that 'trade dress' is a single concept
that encompasses both product configuration and packaging.",, Thus, to differ-
entiate between the two was inappropriate. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit read
Two Pesos as approving the Abercrombie test for determining inherent distinc-
tiveness of product configuration trade dress.8"
Finally, a criticism similar to that in Knitwaves has been leveled against
Duraco. Critics of Duraco have complained that the Third Circuit's test improp-
erly merged the concepts of inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning.9" A
manufacturer would have to present evidence of product advertising and con-
sumer surveys to prove that a product feature would have a likely impact on con-
sumers. 1 This is the type of evidence typically used to prove secondary mean-
ing, not inherent distinctiveness.92 According to critics, this would undermine
Two Pesos, which held that courts may not condition protection of inherently dis-
tinctive marks on a showing of secondary meaning.9"
D. Fourth Circuit-Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd.
9 4
As recently as 1999, the Fourth Circuit was faced with the issue of what consti-
tutes an inherently distinctive product configuration." In Ashley Furniture
Industries, Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., Ashley sued SanGiacomo for copying
the design of one of Ashley's bedroom furniture suites.9" Applying the
Abercrombie test, the Fourth Circuit held that the overall appearance of the furni-
ture was either arbitrary or fanciful and therefore inherently distinctive. 97
Echoing the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., the
court determined that the Abercrombie analysis was the appropriate test for
inherent distinctiveness in product configurations under Two Pesos.98 The Ashley
court rejected the tests fashioned by the First, Second and Third Circuits by rely-
ing, once again, on the criticism enunciated in Stuart Hall." These reasons will
be expanded in the next section.
E. Eighth Circuit-Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp.'
In Stuart Hall, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying the
Abercrombie test, held that the nonfunctional layout and packaging of Stuart
87. See Stuart Hall, 51 F3d at 780.
88. Id. at 787.
89. Id. at 788.
90. Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
91. Stuart Hall, 51 F3d at 788.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ashley Furniture Indus. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 366.
97. Id. at 373.
98. Id. at 371.
99. Id.
100. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995).
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Hall's notebook day-planners was inherently distinctive; therefore, Ampad's simi-
lar planners infringed on Stuart Hall's product design trademark.'' The court
emphatically rejected any test for inherent distinctiveness outside of Abercrombie
as being inconsistent with Two Pesos. 2 According to the Eighth Circuit, Two
Pesos held that product configuration and product packaging should be treated
uniformly.10 3 Therefore, the Abercrombie analysis should be applied in both
instances.0 Further, the court argued that a test which relied on a product con-
figuration trademark's likely impact on consumers would blur the lines between
inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning.' 5
Despite the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the tests espoused by the Second and
Third Circuits, commentators have suggested that the Eighth Circuit's unwilling-
ness to deviate from the Abercrombie test is baseless."0 In determining whether
a product configuration is inherently distinctive, the ultimate question to be
determined is the likely impact on consumers." 7 As one commentator wrote:
when the mark or trade dress is inherently distinctive, we assume that con-
sumers will attach a source-indicating meaning to it. When a mark or dress is
not inherently distinctive, we cannot make that assumption. Thus we require the
plaintiff, through imposition of the secondary meaning requirement, to prove
that consumers actually understand its mark or dress to indicate the product's
origin. The difference between a finding of inherent distinctiveness and a find-
ing of distinctiveness due to secondary meaning is the difference between find-
ing what consumers are likely to think and finding what they do think.'
Therefore, an inquiry into whether a product configuration serves a source-iden-
tifying function does not infringe on the territory of secondary meaning. '09
IV. A UNIFORM TEST FOR DETERMINING INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS
IN PRODUCT CONFIGURATION TRADE DREsS
A. Remaining True to the Purpose of Trademark Law
As many of the cases discussed illustrate, a primary purpose of trademark or
trade dress protection is to protect that which identifies a product's source.
Trademark law seeks to prevent the use of the same or similar marks in a way
that confuses the public about the actual source of the goods. That is, protection
of trademarks seeks to protect a producer's good will. However, competitors are
free to copy as long as consumers are not confused as to the product's source and
the goodwill of the senior producer is not harmed.
101. Id. at 783.
102. Id. at 788.
103. Id. at 787.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 788.
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CHANGING TRENDS IN TRADE DRESS CASES
In the last fifteen years, companies have begun to use the law of unfair compe-
tition, and particularly section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, in an attempt to prohibit
competitors from copying their products-a trend which was encouraged by the
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos. Businesses have successfully claimed
trademark rights in the decor of a restaurant, " ' the shape of a faucet handle,1" '
the design of bedroom furniture, "2 the shape of a lollipop, "3 the shape of a
mixer,"' and the design of personal organizers. " ' Companies have attempted to
protect the pattern on a sweater, 16 the shape of troll dolls,"7 the design of fan
blades," 8 the shape of a Grecian urn planter,"9 and the design of cable ties. 20
While this trend has given businesses a new weapon in the fight against unfair
competition, uncontrolled judicial protection of product features may have the
unwanted consequence of hurting consumers by stifling legitimate competition.
Therefore, any test used to determine inherent distinctiveness in product configu-
rations must be strict enough to preclude protection of designs and configura-
tions that can rightfully be copied; otherwise, a fundamental purpose of trade-
mark law will be compromised.
B. The Proposed Test
Of the four tests currently in use, the Seabrook'Foods test-as modified by the
First Circuit-provides the best option for a uniform test to determine inherent
distinctiveness in product design. As previously discussed, the other tests are not
satisfactory for a variety of reasons. The Abercrombie test works well when
applied to lingual marks but makes little sense when used to determine the inher-
ent distinctiveness of product designs.'2' The Knitwaves test, though similar to
the Seabrook Foods test, relies problematically on a producer's intent to create a
source-identifying product. 2 Finally, the Duraco test is seemingly contrary to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Two Pesos to the extent that the test merges the
concepts of secondary meaning and inherent distinctiveness.'23
The proposed uniform test is a single inquiry that asks "whether the design,
shape, or combination of elements is so unique, unusual or unexpected.., that
one can assume without proof that it will automatically be perceived by cus-
tomers as an indicator of origin-a trademark."'2 4 This test was specifically tai-
lored for use in product design cases; therefore, the main problem associated
110. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
IIl. See Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
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122. See Dinwoodie, supra note 74.
123. See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995).
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with the Abercrombie test-applying a test developed for use with lingual marks
to product configurations-is avoided. Unlike the Knitwaves test, the First
Circuit's test makes no mention of producer intent, but instead relies on the prod-
uct's potential for source-identification in the minds of consumers. Moreover,
this test is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Two Pesos, which
requires courts to separate the inquiry for inherent distinctiveness from that of
secondary meaning in trademark and trade dress cases.
Finally, the First Circuit's test is unlikely to inhibit legitimate copying of func-
tional product features by competitors because of the requirement that the pro-
tected feature be "unique, unusual, or unexpected. ' 5 In applying this test,
courts should be careful to protect only product features that are so unique as to
identify the product's source and not to protect those features that competitors
must copy to legitimately compete. Additionally, strict application of the func-
tionality doctrine should accompany the adoption of this test or any other uni-
form test.
V CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos in 1992, the United States
Courts of Appeals have adopted a variety of incongruous tests to determine
whether product configuration trade dress is inherently distinctive. These tests
have created vast discrepancies from circuit to circuit in trade dress protection
litigation. Moreover, some of these tests have been criticized as being contrary
to the purpose of the Lanham Act. Thus, a standard test for inherent distinctive-
ness in product configuration trade dress that is in line with the Lanham Act
needs to be adopted nationwide. The proposed test provides a simple, straight-
forward approach for determining inherent distinctiveness in product configura-
tion trade dress that utilizes the best features of the current tests while avoiding
their weaknesses. In sum, the test is a clear and uniform method to guide a
court's determination of whether product configuration trade dress is inherently
distinctive.
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